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Significant  fluctuations  of foreign credit flows, domestic
interest  rates and real exchange  rates affected  most financially
semi-open  economies in recent years.  Especially  affected were
those  Southern  hemisphere  countries  which  rapidly  liberalized  their
capital accounts, overborrowed,  and then experienced  a foreign
credit  squeeze.
Chile and New Zealand,  far apart geographically,  are small
primary producers which where long isolated from international
financial  markets.  Both countries  followed  a similar  pattern  of
adjustment following rapid financial liberalization.  Initial
overborrowing  and  real  exchange  rate  overappreciation  led  to a  loss
of competitiveness  and ultimately  a balance of payments crisis,
followed  by  protracted  stagnation  and  real  exchange  rate
depreciation.
Domestic interest  rates  did not converge  rapidly to covered
world  interest  rates  following  liberalization  of capital  markets.
This slow  convergence  posed  severe  problems. With interest  rates
remaining high during the  liberalization  process, and  imports
becoming relatively cheap, domestic producers faced a  credit
squeeze  at the worst  possible  time.
In Chile, the nominal exchange rate was fixed during the
period  of  financial  liberalization (1979-1982), followed by
discrete  devaluations,  a brief  float,  and an active  crawl in the
wake of the 1982-83  financial  crisis  and recession.'
2Several studies have analyzed interest rate adjustmeint  in
Chile.  Corbo and Matte  (1984) estimated a  simple portfolio
adjustment  model.  The offset  coefficient  for Chile  was less  than
minus  one,  implying  less  than  perfect  capital  mobility,  despite  the
liberalization  policies.  Edwards (1985), on the  other hand,
defined a "semi-open"  economy  as one in which the interest  rate
depends  on both domestic  credit  conditions  as well as on covered
foreign  interest  rates.  With  standard  econometric  techniques,  he
found  Chile (as  well  as Colombia)  to be financially  semi-open,  and
not  open  (in which case only covered foreign interest rates
matter).  Valdes-Prieto (1992)  reviews Chilean capital-account
liberalization,  concluding  that  both  its  timing  and intensity  were
beneficial  to the country,  in spite  of the costs  of overborrowing
due to inadequate  banking  supervision  before  1983.
The New Zealand  experience  of liberalization  and reform  came
much later  than the Chilean  experience.  As well as similarities,
there  are some  important  differences  from  the Chilean  adjustment.
The debt that was accumulated  in New Zealand  was mostly private
debt, and never was  assumed by the government, as  in Chile,
followed by the financial  crises in 1982.  There was no high
inflation  problem,  comparable  to Chile,  although a reduction  of
inflation  rates  from  double-digit  levels  was a  goal of  the reforms
set in place in 1985.  The nominal  exchange  rate  was floated  after
liberalization,  but  in 1988,  the  Reserve  Bank  changed  the  emphasis
of monetary  policy  to greater  exchange  rate. 2
3We develop  a two-sector,  model  for  current  and  capital-account
interaction  during  financial  liberalization.  It  yields  the  dynamic
relations  between  foreign  debt  accumulation,  the  real  exchange  rate
and  domestic  interest  rate  adjustment  (when  all  three  variables  are
endogenous)  under imperfect  asset  substitutability  and imperfect
capital  mobility. With  regard  to trade  in  goods  and non-financial
services,  different  degrees  of openness  are consistent  with this
general framework. *e wish to explain  the sharp fluctuations  in
domestic  interest  rates,  real exchange  rates,  and capital  inflows
following  financial  liberalization.  In  particular,  we wish  to show
that  during  the  process  of  financial  liberalization, the
responsiveness  of  the  domestic  interest  rate  to  underlying  domestic
variables diminishes over time, as it slowly converges to the
covered  world interest  rate,  while  the real  exchange  rate  becomes
increasingly  more  responsive  to domestic  variables. 34
our starting  point  is Dor;busch  and Fischer (1980).  However.
rather  than  following  a  national/foreign  goods  dichotomy,  we define
the  real  exchange  rate  as  the  relative  price  in  a  traded/non-traded
goods model.  In addition  to the two assets in the Dornbusch-
Fischer  model,  money  and foreign  bonds,  we also introduce  a third
asset,  domestic  bonds,  which enables  us to model imperfect  asset
substitutability  and  imperfect capital mobility.  We  assume
imperfect  capital mobility in response to domestically imposed
restrictions  on flows  or on holdings  of foreign  capital  or debt.
Imperfect  capital  mobility  thus  allows  for  short-run  deviations  of
domestic interest  rates from their long-run  equilibrium  levels.
4Because  of additional  imperfect  asset  substitutability,  stationary
equilibrium  interest  ratem  also  deviate  from  values  under  perfect
arbitrage.
Xouri  and Porter (1974)  have used  a portfolLo  model in which
domestic  and foreign  assets  are imperfect  substitutes. There  are
two differences  between  our portfolio  model  and theirs.  We model
explicitly  the  variables  which  are  behind  imperfect
substitutability  between domestic and  foreign bonds  and  we
distinguish between  instantaneous and  long-run asset  market
equilibria.
In  our  dependent-economy  specification  the  current  account  is
determined  by the  excess  of income  over  absorption. We assume  that
the nominal  exchange  rate is controlled  by the government  and is
subject to  discrete or  continuous changes or  even  to  fixed
exchange-rate  periods. While  this  assumption  does  not  fit  strictly
the New Zealand experience  for the first three years following
liberalization  (1985-1988),  it  does apply  to the New Zealand  case
from 1975-85  and from 1988  to the present.  Furthermore,  greater
real exchange  rate volatility  under flexible  exchange  rates  with
capital mobility is  an  implication of  nominal exchange rate
overshooting  explored  by Dornbusch  (1976). While  the  model  can be
recast  for  the  case  of  flexible  exchange  rates,  the  propositions  we
derive  for  real  exchange  rate  and interest  rate  behavior  are  valid
for  both a fixed  and flexible  exchange  rate regimes.
In the next section  we present  the model, for the benchmark
case of perfect capital mobility.  In section II we study the
5dynamics  of the real exchange  rate, capital inflows  and domestic
interest  rates  under  imperfect  capital  mobility. In section  III  we
present the results  of an empirical  analysis--using  tim,  -varying
parameter  methods--of  the real exchange  rate,  the interest  rate,
net exports,  and  foreign  reserves  for  both  countries. The Chilean
period covers the  1975-1982 bust-boom-bust  years of financial
liberalization  and high foreign  debt accumulation,  while  the New
Zealand  analysis  spans  1975  to 1991,  with  financial  liberalization,
real  exchange  rate  appreciation,  and  output  stagnation  beginning  in
1985.
I.  aGNERAL  EQUILIBRIUM  UNDER  IMPERFECT  ASSET  SUBSTITUTABILITY  AND
PERFECT  CAPITAL  MOBILITY
Our  model  specifies asset and  goods markets equilibrium
conditions,  and under  capital  mobility  spells  out the dynamics  of
foreign asset  accumulation.  From  this,  we  derive  dynamic
equilibrium  conditions  for foreign  asset  accumulation  and  the real
exchange  rate.  Although  inflationary and  exchange  rate
devaluation  expectations  appear  in  the model,  they  do so in order
to  define  real  interest  rates  and  arbitrage  levels  of international
interest rates.  We  make  no  assumptions about  expectations
mechanisms,  since we do not analyze  continued  exogenous  nominal
exchange-rate  changes  nor changes  in long-run  inflation  rates.
6I.A.  asset-Markets  Equilibria  and  Wealth
Total private domestic  wealth (w) is composed of fiinancial
wealth (wf)  and real  wealth (wr). Financial  wealth is the sum of
three outside assets in private hands:  domestic money  (M),
domestic  government  bonds (B)  and  foreign  assets (F),  each  of them
deflated  by the domestic  price index  (Q).
Continuous asset market clearing ensures that real asset
demands L,  BD  and  FD  equate actual real  asset  holdings at
equilibrium  returns. The signs  of the  partial  derivatives  of each
variable  in  the  equations  appear  in  brackets  below  the
corresponding functions. The  three demand functions have the
Aollowing  form:
(1)  M/Q - L(i, i* + ALR + l+ O, y  wf)
t  ~ ~  ~  ~  *  ,  _
(2)  B/Q  =BD(i,  i* + ALR +  P+  ,  y, wf)
[+,  -,  ?,  +  ]
(3)  EF/Q =  FD(i, i*  +  A  LR  +  to  +  0, y, wf)
1-,  +1  ?,  +  ]
where  i  and i are  the  nominal  domestic  and foreign  interest  rates,
respectively,  LR is  a  variable  measuring  legal  restrictions  imposed
on capital  flows,  A  is the  corresponding  non-negative  coefficient,
E is  the  nominal  exchange  rate (units  of  domestic  currency  per  unit
of foreign  currency),  Sl is  the expected  rate  of devaluation,  * is
a risk-premium  parameter,  and  y is  current  real  dienosable  income.
Legal  restrictions  can be  established  by domestic  authorities
on foreign  asset  or liability  holdings,  and/or  on flows  of foreign
assets  or liabilities. Restrictions  on stock  holdings  of foreign
7assets  or liabilities  aff  act the LR variable influencing  asset
demands  in  equations  (1)  - (3),  even  in  the case  of  perfect  capital
mobility, But  capital  mobility  is  mainly  impaired  by restrictions
on capital  flows,  which  are introduced  in the following  section.
For  the  purpose  of our  analysis  the  variable  LR captures  the  extent
of restrictions  on both  foreign  capital  holdii.,a  and flows.  In our
model,  financial  liberalization  means a reduction  in the foreign
transactions  costs on domestic bonds as well as a  reduction in
domestic  transaction  costs  of foreign  bonds.5
Domestic  and foreign assets also are imperfect  substitutes
because  of a second  variable,  the  risk  premium  on domestic  assets.
In section  II we define  9 as a function  of the foreign  position.
The domestic - foreign interest  spread thus depends on foreign
asset  holdings.
Finally  the domestic  interest  rate  could  differ  in the short
run from its long-run (imperfect)  arbitrage  value represented  by
the  second argument in  the  preceding equations, because of
imperfect  or slow  capital  mobility. This is the case  modelled  in
section  II.  Here  we assume  the benchmark  case  of perfect  capital
mobility  with imperfect  arbitrage.
Consistent  with the above equations,  total financial  wealth
must satisfy  the following  adding-up  constraint:
(4)  wf  M + B + E F  /Q
where Q is the price  deflator defined as a weighted average of
domestic traded  (PT)  and non-traded  (PN)  goods  prices:
(5)  Q  =  PT  PM
8where a  is the share  of non-traded  goods ir the price  deflator.
Assuming  that  purchasing-power  parity  holds  continuously,  for
domestic traded goods prices (  PT  =  E  P", with internationally-
traded  goods  prices  denoted  by P-),  and defining  the real  exchange
rate  p as  the  ratio  of  domestic  traded  and  ron-traded  goods  prices,
the  effective exchange rate, E/Q, is given by  the  following
function  of the real  exchange  rate:
(6)  E/Q _ pa/  p
Total real wealth  of the private  sector  is the valuation  of
current  and  future  income  streams  adjusted  by changes  in the  terms
of trade.  With the domestic  price index  Q as the numeraire,  real
wealth depends on the domestic (ex-ante)  real rate of interest,
permanent  income  (yp)  and  the terms  of trade (tt):
(7)  wr =  wr(i-vr,  yp, tt)
_,  +,  1]
where  Wre is the expected  rate of domestic  inflation.
Combining  equations  (4)  and (7)  and using (6),  we obtain  the
following  function  for  total  wealth:)
(8)  w z  CM  + B + EF]/  Q +  wr (i-M,  yp tt)
3  w(M, B, p, f, i-ve,  yp, tt)
[+,  +1  +,  +,  -,  +1  +]
In  this  equation,  real  asset  holdings  M/Q and  B/Q  are  replaced
by a function  which  separate  the influence  of nominal  holdings  and
the real exchange rate, 6 and f represents  the value of foreign
assets  in real domestic-currency  units.  Hence,  f =  E F /  Q.
9I.3.  Goods Markets Equilibria in a Dependent Economy
In a two-sector dependent  .conomy,  the real exchange rate (and
the absolute non-traded goods price) is  determined by the following
equilibrium condition for non-traded goods:
(9)  YN(P)  =  CN(P, w(f,  Ij.-.7  ,  PI yp, tt), i-7rJ  + JN(Pt  i-  r)+  g
[-]  t+,  +,+,  -,  +, +,  +,  ?  ]  - ]
where sub-index i  (i =  N for non-traded goods in equation  (9), T
or traded goods in equation (10)  below) denotes the goods sector,
is sectoral output supply, c,  is sector consumption demand, j;  is
sector  investment  demand,  f,e  is  traded  and  non-traded  sector
expeoted inflation, and g is public consumption, falling entirely
on non-traded goods.
Sector  supply  and  demand  equilibrium  functions  appearing
aquation  (9)  are  consistent  with  intertemporal  optimization,
although we do  not  explicitly derive  them  from  an optimization
)rogram.  Non-traded  consumption depends positively  on the real
exchange rate and on private wealth, and ambiguously on the real
te  of  interest,  while  investment  in non-traded  goods  depends
sitively on the real exchange rate and negatively on the real
terest. 8 9
The  trade  surplus  (or net  exports)  in  quantity  terms  is
termined by the excess supply of traded goods:
^) NX - YT(P1  - CT(p,  w(f, i_.7C  ,  p, yp, tt),  Ii-r)  - JT(P,  i-eo)
I+J  [,  +,+,  _,  +, +,  +,  ?  J  i:,  -]
Since the real exchange rate comes from the non-traded market
Learing  condition, we solve equation (9) for the following real
10exchange rate equation:
(9') p = p(f, i-T  ,  yp, g,  tt)
[  +,  -,  -'  ,  _]
Collecting terms in equation (10), we derive the following
function for quantum net exports or the trade balance:10
(10')  NX = NX(p, w(f, i-v°,  p, yp, tt), i-if°)
(+  -_,+,  -,  +1  +1  +1  ]
I.C.  Foreign sector equilibrium
Foreign asset accumulation satisfies the following balance of
payments identity defined in terms of foreign currency:
(11) F =  P  NX(p, w(f, i-7r 0 , p, yp, tt), i-nr)  +  i  (F+R) -R
[+1  -_+,  -,  +,  +1  +1  +]
where  R  measures  international  reserves  in  units  of  foreign
currency.
Multiplying  equation  (11) by E/Q, we obtain  the balance of
payments  restriction  in  real  domestic  currency  units.  By  an
appropriate  substitution,  we  transform  equation  (11)  into  an
equation describing the accumulation of foreign assets defined in
terms of real domestic currency units:
*  *  v
,11') f = pNX(p,  w(f,i-irf,  p, yp, tt), i-7e)  +(i*+bIw-ie)(f+r)  -r
(+.  -,+,  -*  +1  +1  +1  +]
where r measures the stock of international reserves in real
domestic currency units and E°  is the expected rate of devaluation.
11I.D.  General Equilibrium
Domestic financial markets  (for money and government bonds)
clear  instantaneously.  We  assume  perfect  capital  mobility,
implying arn  infinite velocity of international capital  flows in
response to foreign-domestic interest differentials.  The interest
arbitrage  condition  holds  continuously  for  given  levels  of
devaluation expectations, legal restrictions and country risk.  We
call this the imperfect arbitrage condition:
(12)  i=  i +  t  +  A  LR +  4
The dynamic paths of foreign assets and the real exchange rate
appear in Figure 1.  The phase diagram is based on equations  (9')
and  (11').  The NN schedule represents  in (f-p) space continuous
non-traded goods market clearing equation  (9').  Appendix 1 shows
that the NN curve is unambiguously downward sloping, because higher
foreign assets have a positive wealth effect on consumption which
lowers the equilibrium real exchange rate.  Imposing the steady
state equilibrium condition on equation (11'),  we obtain the (f=O)
schedule in Figure 1.  Its slope is ambiguous and depends on the
current account consequences of the wealth effect on consumption
relative to the debt-servicing effects when foreign assets
increase.  Assuming the wealth effect dominates, the (f=O)  schedule
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Real  Exchange  Rate  and  Foreign  Asset  Dynamics
Under  Perfect  Capital  Mobililty
13Dynamic adjustment takes place along the NN schedule.  Steady-
state  equilibrium  is reached when  the  increase  in foreign  debt
stops. such as at the international dynamic equilibrium position at
point A.
An increase  in permanent  income raises consumption  of both
traded and non-traded goods, and forces a leftward shift of both
the NN and the (f=O) curve-  in Figure  1.  The  impact  effect  of
higher spending is an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The
effect depends only on the size of the increase in yp and on the
elasticity of the excess supply of non-traded goods with respect to
real  exchange rate.  Dynamic  adjustment  along  the  N'N'  schedule
shows simultaneous real exchange rate depreciation and foreign debt
accumulation.  The final effect on p is ambiguous, depending on the
value  of final wealth  resulting  from higher  levels  of permanent
income  and  of  foreign  debt,  as compared  to  initial  stationary
wealth.  If  initial and final wealth  levels  coincide,  the  real
exchange rate returns to its initial value." 1
II.  CAPITAL FLOWS AND DOMESTIC ADJUSTMENT UNDER IMPERFECT
CAPITAL MOBILITY
Under  imperfect  international  capital  mobility,  domestic
interest  rates  temporarily  deviate  from  their  international
imperfect  arbitrage  levels.  Domestic  interest rates  adjust  to
continuous  short-run  money  and domestic  bond market  equilibrium
conditions,  although  incentives  for  changing  the  portfolio
composition  remain  as long as the  imperfect arbitrage  condition
14given by equation  (12) -is  not zet.  This occurs because domestic
asset holders can not quickly change their portfolio compositions
by  buying  or  selling  foreign  assets  because  of  domestic  legal
restrictions imposed on foreign capital flows.
To derive the  behavior of  interest rates  and  international
reserves under imperfect capital mobility, we focus on the monetary
flow  equilibrium  condition,  which  equates  constant-price  flow
supply and demand:
(13)  (M/Q)  =  L
Money supply is increased by accumulating  domestic credit and
international  reserves.  Asset  holders  adjust  their  monetary
balances over time in response to the difference  between desired
and  actual holdings.  They  do this  by exchanging  international
reserves  for foreign assets at a  speed j times  the gap between
desired  and  effective  monetary  holdings.  Hence  flow  monetary
equilibrium relates reserve accumulation and monetary flow demand
as follows:
(13') (ER/Q)  +  (C/Q) =  B[LD  _ (M/Q)] + (C/Q)
where  LD  is  desired  or  long-run  real  money  holdings  under
conditions  of  imperfect  interest  arbitrage,  1  is  the  speed  of
adjustment  coefficient, and  (C/Q) is the stock of real domestic
credit of the central bank.
Excess  demand  of  money  causes  domestic  interest  rates  to
increase  instantly  (and domestic  bond  prices  to  fall).  Asset
15holders accumulate cash balances by  turnipg to international credit
markets, where they sell foreign assets  (or accumulate  debt) and
change  the  proceeds  at  the  domestic  central  bank  for  domestic
currency.  Through  this  sluggish  monetary  adjustment  process,
domestic interest rates come down and cash balances increase until
stationary monetary equilibrium is reestablished.
The difference  between the short-run  interest rate  and its
long-run arbitrage level depends only on the partial derivative of
the money demand with respect to the domestic interest rate.
The speed with which asset holders accumulate money balances
depends  on  the  legal  restrictions  which  regulate  the  flows  or
acquisitions  of  foreign  assets  or  liabilities.  Hence  j  is  a
negative function of the legal restrictions variable LR:
(15)  B =  B(LR)
t-]
The country-risk parameter 9 depends negatively on the  stock
of foreign assets or liabilities,  a frequently used indicator for
a country's foreign position for a given GDP level:
(16)  9  =  9(f)
t-]
This function could be either continuously differentiable or
could have a kink at a critical value of the stock of foreign debt.
After  substitution  and use  of  desired  and  actual  domestic
money  stocks LD and L, we obtain the following equation  for the
change in international reserves at constant prices:
16(17)  B(LR)  (LD (i=i+ALR+  +§(f  i+ALR+A(f),  ff  y, Wif)
1-  I  [0  ,  1  +  +  ]
L(i,  i*+LR+Ee+§(f)  y, wf)]
t1  ,  ,  +, +]
We substitute  the  equilibrium real  exchange  rate  [equation
(9')] and the  foreign-reserve  accumulation  (equation  (17)) into
equation  (11), to obtain the following equation for foreign asset
accumulation under imperfect Capital mobility:
(18) f  =  (p(f,i-ffw,yp,g,tt)J]  NX(f,i-r%  yp,g,tt) + (i+EC  -.. 7r)(f+r)  -
t,  +,  -,  -,  - [-,  ,  -,  -,  ]
B(LR)[LD(  i=i'+ALR+t§  (f),  i*+LR+Ae+(f),  y, wf(f)
I  -,  _,  +,  +,+]
L(i,  i*+LR+A  +  (f),  y, wf(f))]
[-,  -,  +1  +,+]
In equation  (18)  3  plays the role of the offset coefficient
first presented  by Kouri  and Porter  (1974), which  measures  the
effect  of  an  increase  in  domestic  credit  on  foreign  asset
accumulation. But there are two important differences between our
framework and the Kouri and Porter model.  We specify the variables
explaining  imperfect substitution  (LR and *),  and we distinguish
between  instantaneous  and  long-run equilibria  in asset markets.
Our  offset  coefficient  depends  explicitly  on  the  variable
determining  imperfect  capital  mobility  (LR),  and  not  on  the
magnitude  of  the  interest elasticities  of asset  demands,  as  in
their model.
17Substitution of 0  from equation (16) into (18)  reinforces the
negative effect  of f on *foreign  asset accumulation.  We already
assumed this when we postulated the dominance of the wealth effect
over the interest effect when f increases.
On the other hand foreign asset accumulation in equation (18)
depends ambiguously  on the domestic interest rate.  A  rise in i
increases net exports but also induces a higher  foreign reserve
accumulation as asset holders build up cash balances in response to
their excess demand for money.  If the latter effect dominates, f
falls with the interest rate.1 2 This is the case reflected by the
negatively sloped  (f=o) schedule in Figure 2, which shows steady-
state foreign asset equilibrium under imperfect capital mobility in
(f-i) space.
What  about  instantaneous  or  short-run  equilibrium  in  the
domestic money market?  From equation (1), after substitution of Q
from equation (6) and p from equation (9),  we obtain the following
expression for i in terms of the determinants of stock supply and
current  (not desired) stock demand:
(19)  i  =  i((M/EP*),7ff,  f, yp,  g, tt,  i*+ALR+k0+§(f),  y)
-,  +1  +,  +,  +,  +,  -_  +]
The II curve in Figure 2  represents the unambiguously positive
relation between i and f in equation (19).  Adjustment takes place
on this curve after a disturbance to the dynamic system given by




Domestic  Interest  Rate  and  Foreign  Asset  Dynamics
Under  Imperfect  Capilal  Mobility
19Long-term or stationary  equilibrium  is reestablished  when
domestic  interest  rates  reach  imperfect  arbitrage  levels  determined
by stationary  values  consistent  with  equation  (12). The  adjustment
equation  for domestic  interest  rates  is derived  from  the relation
between  money  demand  and  the interest  rate  in equation  (20),  where
e is the partial derivative  of money demand  with respect to the
interest  rate:
(20)  L=  ei=0(LR)  ILD  - L]
With further substitution,  the adjustment  of domestic interest
rates is given  by the following  equation:
(21) i =  (8(LR)/e] ILD(i=i+ALR+t+9(f),  i*+pLR+k+9(f),  y, wf(f))
(_-  I  - ,  - ,  +  ,  +,+J
- L(i,  i-+LR+t?+§(f),  y,  wf(f))]
[-S  _,  +,  +,  +  ]
From  equation  (21)  the  steady-state  condition  (i=0)  is  reached
when domestic interest rates converge to their parity levels
determined  by equation (12). The (i=o)  curve  in  Figure  2,
negatively sloped since I  is  negatively related to  f,  thus
coincides  with  the imperfect  arbitrage  condition. This  curve  also
represents  the foreign  credit  supply  schedule  which  relates  higher
foreign  debt levels  to higher  credit  costs.
An increase  in  permanent  income  causes  leftward  shifts  of  both
the (i=0)  and the II  curves. The impact  effect  is a  real exchange
rate  appreciation  and  an  increase  in  the  domestic  interest  rate,  as
shown in Figure 2.  Then foreign  debt is accumulated,  the real
20exchange rate depreciates and the domestic interest rate falls as
adjustment continues on the II  curve toward the final steady state
at point C in Figure 2.
This  adjustment  process  is  quite  different  from  the
corresponding one under perfect capital mobility.  Under perfect
capital  mobility  the  domestic  interest  rate  is  continuously
maintained  at  its  imperfect  arbitrage  level,  while  the  real
exchange rate shows greater variability.  Under imperfect capital
mobility,  the  reverse  is  true.  The  increase  in the  domestic
interest rate  reflects  a  lower foreign debt  accumulation  and  a
lower domestic monetary accumulation than under perfect mobility,
during  the  first  phase  of  dynamic  adjustment  process.  The
instantaneous appreciation of the real exchange  rate  is smaller
under imperfect capital mobility because of the partly offsetting
effect of the higher interest rate on p.
Although the dynamic transition of f, i, and p is different in
the  polar  cases  of  perfect  and  imperfect  mobility,  the  fir'tl
stationary levels are the same.
III. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS: CHILE AND
NEW ZEALAND
In  this section  we discuss simplified relationships implied by
the  model  developed  above,  which  are  suitable  for  dynamic
econometric analysis.  Then we present the results of estimation
with  constant  parameters  and  with  time-varying  parameters
separately for each country.
21III.A.  Relations IMplied by Model
Equations  (9) and  (9')  imply a relation  between  the  real
exchange rate, domestic financial wealth, the real interest rate,
and government expenditures:
(22) pt  =  p(wr,,  wf,,  ir,  ,  g,)
[,g  -,  +,  -]
where  ir,  is the real interest rate defined as i-al" 3. Since real
wealth is not observable, it has been omitted from equation  (22),
which  includes only  on financial wealth  as the  domestic  wealth
argument.  The latter variable is defined as the sum of foreign
assets and international reserves.  HenCe, wf =  f+r.
In order to deriva a reduced-form equation for the short-term
nominal interest rate, actual holdings of base money are assumed to
be a weighted average of desired holdings and ex-ante monetary base
(z).  Hence  the  domestic  nominal  interest  rate  relates  to  the
foreign interest rate, (i + ft),,  foreign assets, foreign reserves,
and monetary base, z:
(23) it  - i(it  + E, f,  t  r,  *  zt)
*  (  ?,  ?,  +,  -
The first two right-hand variables present an ambiguous sign.
For  empirical  reasons  we  expect  the  dominance  of  the  positive
effects in each case, as discussed in Appendix 2.
Instead  of  specifying  a  relation  for  foreign  assets,  we
specify two separate relations, for net exports and foreign reserve
22accumulation, consistent with the  model.  The net exports (quantum)
function consistent  with (10') is:
(24)  NXt  =  NX(p,,  wf,,  irj)
[1 ,+,  -J
Finally, foreign  reserves demand consistent with equation (17)
is given by:
(25) r,  =  r(i,  +  E,,  f,,  4,, r,_)
-,  +,  -,  +]
III.B.  Stationarity of the Data
For dynamic econometric analysis, the variables  in equations
(22) through (25) must be stationary.  For many of the variables,
first  differences  will  have  to  be  used,  but  levels  may  be
appropriate for those that are stationary.
Table 1  contains the results of Phillips - Perron (1988)  tests
for the stationarity of these variables  in levels, for both the
Chilean and New Zealand quarterly data.  For Chile, only the real
interest rate is unambiguously stationary in levels, while for New
Zealand  both  the  foreign  interest  rate  and  net  exports  are
stationary in levels.  All of the other variables are unambiguously
stationary in first-differences.14
III.C.  Estimation  Results, Constant Parameters
For  estimating  dynamic  relations  based  on  equations  (22)
through (25),  we followed the general-to-specific approach of David
Hendry (1986).  Each of the four equations, with variables in first
differences, or in levels if appropriate, was estimated with a
23r  '  f't
Table  1
Phillins  - Perron  Unit  Root  Tests  of Macroeconomic  Variables
CHILE,  197S-1982
Two  Unit  Roots  vs.  One  One  Unit  Root  vs.  None
Variable:  2(13)  3(12)  Z(11)  Z(13)  Z(12)  z(l)
p  19.65  12.97  18.48  3.89  2.69  1.88
wf  14.50  9.59  10.67  2.18  1.54  0.50
ir  26.51  17.39  27.66  14.02*  9.28*  14.13*
g  16.00  10.67  16.69  4.28  2.86  2.90
£  31.07  20.44  28.51  7.25  5.04  5.22
i  +  18.31  12.15  16.54  8.15  5.63  8.26*
f  16.06  10.62  12.26  2.52  1.88  0.23
r  14.15  9.35  14.10  1.36  1.31  1.20
z  8.87  5.88  8.20  1.29  0.92  1.18
nx  13.27  8.77  12.e2  2.02  1.41  1.20
MEN  ZEA>LND,  1975-1991
p  30.12  20.03  28.74  5.87  4.01  0.49
wf  42.38  28.14  42.51  7.41  5.02  2.48
ir  45.75  30.36  46.47  11.02*  7.41*  3.30
g  36.60  24.36  36.04  2.95  1.97  2.66
i  30.15  20.03  30.13  5.22  3.48  4.32
i*+E  58.38  38.74  59.42  32.84*  21.83*  32.22*
f  44.32  29.41  45.05  3.72  2.64  1.29
r  43.25  28.70  43.55  9.18*  6.22*  1.86
z  51.03  33.83  51.20  11.64*  7.78*  5.42
nx  50.27  33.33  51.19  17.93*  11.93*  17.63*
In test  model:  y(t)  =  u  +  b t  +  a y(t-l)  +  e(t)
z(13)  tests  a-1,  b=0
z(12)  tests  a-1,  b=0,  u  0
z(13)  tests  a-1,  u-0,  given  b-0.
where  y  is the  respective  variable  to be  tested,  t  is time,  e  is the  residual,
and  u, b, and  a are  coefficients.
*  Significant  at the  one  percent  level,  in rejection  of  appropriate  unit  root
hypothesis  vs.  no unit  root.
24four-period lag  structure.  Then  "irrelevant" variables were
progressively  eliminated.  Irrelevant  variables are those which
were  not  significant, and  whose omission did  not  affect the
significance of the remaining variables.  eI
The results  for the Chilean  data appear  in Table 2, and for
the New Zealand  data appear  in Table  3.  In addition  to the usual
regression  estimates,  each  table  has a set  of diagnostic  tests  for
evaluating  autocorrelation,  normality  of the disturbance  terms,
heteroskedasticity,  and  misspecification,  with  chi-square
statistics.'16
While  financial liberalization  makes  this  assumption of
constant coefficients  hard to defend, these results serve as a
benchmark  for assessing  how much time-varying  coefficient  values
depart from the constant parameter values which represent the
average coefficient  values for the entire  period.  The constant
coefficients  also allow  a quick  comparison  between  countries,  for
assessing  the  importance of  specific  variables  during  the
adjustment  period.
Table  2  shows that  the  Chilean real  exchange rate  is
significantly  determined  hy real interest  rate6 and its own lag.
Neither wealth  nor  government spending  affect  the  relative
traded/nontraded  goods price.  For New Zealand the opposite is
true:  Table  3 shows  that  both  wealth  and government  spending  are
significant,  with the expected  signs.
25Table 2
The  Estimated  Model
Chile,  1975.3  - 1982.4
The  Real  Exchance  Rate:
Ap=  -0.027 +  .448Ap,.,  +  .673 ir,.,  -.772 ir,. 2 +  .673 ir,. 3
(1.63)  (2.23)  (2.94)  (3.17)  (2.58)
D.W. =  1.96  RSQC =  .412
Diagnosticst  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  .395  4  .982
Normality  3.37  - .184
ARCH  2.39  4  .663
Heteroskedasticity  3.10  - .927
Specification  6.67  2  .035
The Nominal Interest Rate:
Ai =  -0.0062 +  0.349 A(i*+°),. 2 -.00071 Af, +  .0032Ar. 2 -.0004 Az 1. 2
(1.21)  (2.46)  (1.04)  (1.75)  (2.23)
D.W.  =  1.83  RSQC  =  .45
Diagnostics:  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  1.26  4  .86
Normality  1.34  - .50
ARCH  2.01  4  .73
Heteroskedasticity  4.22  - .83
Specification  1.31  2  .51
Net Exports:
Anx =  -.561 +  .683 Anx,, -.169 Awf,. 3 +  22.62 ir 14
(.969) (4.16)  (1.90)  (5.79)
D.W.  =  2.17  RSCQ  =  .645
Diagnostics:  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  6.23  4  .182
Normality  1.48  - .476
ARCH  3.03  4  .551
Heteroskedasticity  8.95  - .176
Specification  2.88  2  .236
Foreian Reserves:
Ar  =  .883 -.1318 Af,. 4 - 32.067 A(i-+t*). 2
(1.66) (1.78)  (2.06)
D.W.  =  1.11  RSCQ  =  .102
Diagnostics:  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  5.14  4  .272
Normality  .670  - .715
ARCH  3.08  4  .543
Heteroskedasticity  1.27  - .865
Specification  7.58  2  .022
26Table 3
The Estluated Modol
New Zealand. 1976.3  - 1991.1
The Real Exchange Rate:
Ap  -0.004 +  .235  Ap 1.,  -6.014E-06 Awf,. 2 -3.74E-07 Ag,.3
(1.12)  (1.97)  (1.63)  (2.43)
D.W.  - 2.00  RSQC =  .207
Diagnostics:  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  3.15  4  .530
Normality  1.35  - .508
ARCH  1.54  4  .818
Heteroskedasticity  4.55  - .601
Specification  1.04  2  .594
The Nominal Interest Rate:
Ai  - -0.419 -.0304(i-+!),,3  -.031(iL-+k). 4 -.0003Af,,  +.0011Ar, 1 ,  -.0031Az, 4
(1.170  (2.08)  2.27)  (2.16)  (4.03)  (1.51)
D.W.  = 1.84  RSQC =  .36
Diagnostic.:  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial  correlation  4.59  4  .33
Normality  1.55  - .45
ARCH  5.36  4  .25
Heteroskedasticity  17.8  - .05
Specification  7.03  2  .02
Net Exports:
=x -78.7 +  .716 nx,,  -.546 nx, 2 +  .594 nx,,3  -2110 Ap,.,  +1735 Ap.2  +1640 Ap,3
(1.34)  (7.24)  (5.34)  (6.31)  (2.76)  (1.97)  (2.10)
-.051 Awf,. 2 +  .049 Awf,, -35.98 Air,. 2
(2.15)  (2.06)  (2.99)
D.W.  - 2.26  RSCQ - .61
Diagnosticst  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  5.47  4  .242
Normality  0.96-  - .617
ARCH  4.97  4  .290
Heteroskedasticity  14.3  - .703
Specification  2.25  2  .324
Foreian Reserves:
Ar  - 276.31  -17.60  (iL+*k),  +  .154  Af. 2
(2.64)  (2.81)  (2.49)
D.W. =  1.87  RSCQ =  .128
Diagnostics:  Stat  order  P-Value
Serial correlation  5.70  4  .222
Normality  3.55  - .168
ARCH  18.3  4  .001
Heteroskedasticity  10.0  - .040.
Specification  10.3  2  .005
27Nominal interest  rates are significantly  sensitive  to most
variables  expected  a  priori. For  Chile,  covered  arbitrage  interest
levels  (i*+k)  have  a  dominant  influence  on  domestic  nominal  rates,
during  a period  characterized  by massive  changes  in the access  to
foreign  credit  markets.
While  foreign  assets  (the  negative  of the  gross  foreign  debt)
are not significant,  the role  of foreign  reserves  is significant.
Ex-ante domestic money  supply z  presents the  correct sign,
negatively  associated  to domestic  nominal  interest  rates. Table  3
shows  that  for  New  Zealand,  foreign  assets,  reserves,  and  the  money
supply  are  also  significant, with  the  same  signs  as  the
corresponding  variables  in the Chilean  equation.  For the foreign
arbitrage  interest  rates,  however,  the  story  is  different: higher
levels at three and four lags lead to less change in domestic
interest rates, implying a  ceiling or  bound on  the  domestic
interest  rates,  characteristic  of the pre-liberalization  period.
With regard to the determination  of the excess supply of
traded  goods  or the net  exports  quantum (NX),  for  Chile,  only  two,
the real interest  rate and real wealth,  are significant. Wealth
has  a  negative  effect,  through  its  effect  on  consumption,  while  the
effect  of the  real  interest  rate  is  positive,  through  its  effect  on
domestic  demand. For  New Zealand,  the  story  is  somewhat  different.
Apart  from  its  own  lagged  effects,  the  real  exchange  rate  initially
has a negative  effect,  but at two and three period  lags it has a
positive  effect. The total  effect  is positive.  Wealth  also  has
opposite effects at two and four lags, but the total effect is
negative. Finally,  the real interest  effect  is negative  and at a
28two-period  lag, reflecting  a different  channel than the Chilean
case,  which  was  positive  at  a  four-period  lag:  higher  real
interest rates depress the current account as capital is  drawn into
the country.
Tables 2 and 3 show that foreign reserves are significantly
determined  by  the  same  variables,  although  at  different  lag
lengths.  For  Chile,  reserves respond  negatively  to changes  in
foreign interest, and are negatively related to changes in foreign
assets.  For New Zealand, higher foreign interest levels lead to
reserve  losses,  but  foreign  asset  accumulation  has  a  positive
effect on reserve changes, implying that reserves where insulated
from capital movements.
At  the five percent level of significance, practically all of
the tests are insignificant, and thus do not allow us to reject the
hypothesis  of  white  noise.  The  exception  is  the  test  for
specification in the reserve equation for both countries, as well
as for ARCH in the New Zealand reserve equation, and specification
in the Chilean real exchange rate equation.
The absence of serial correlation in  the equations permits the
use  of  Kalman  filtering  for  evaluating  the  variability  of  the
coefficients over time.  The possibility of specification error in
the dynamic linear model with constant coefficients, indicated by
the tests, indicates that the use of a time-varying coefficients
may be a more appropriate specification for the model during the
liberalization process.
29III.D.  Estimation Results with Kalman Filtering
The Kalman filter follows a two-stage process for estimating
the time-varying coefficients.  At time t, an optimal predictor for
the dependent variable is formed, using all information available
up to and  including time t.  In the second-stage,  the  forecast
error  is used to modify the coefficients, and new information is
used  to  generate  new  predictions  at  time  t+1  for  time  t+2.
Detailed descriptions of Kalman filtering appear  in Anderson and
Moore  (1979), Pagan  (1980), Hansen  and  Sargent  (1991), Harvey
(1981) and  Chow  (1984).  Intuitively, the Kalman  filter  may be
described as an "optimal discounting" of past data to find the best
one-period forward predictor. 17
Figures 3  through 6  picture the adjustment of key coefficients
in the real exchange rate equation, the interest rate equation, net
exports, and the reserves for Chile,  during the period of financial
liberalization.
We  see  in  Figure  3  that  the  real  exchange  rate  became
progressively  more  responsive  (negatively) to the  real  interest
rate at the lag of two periods, whereas the positive effects of the
real interest rates at lags one and  three progressively diminished.
.As the  economy became more open, the capital flow effects of real
interest rates had progressively stronger negative effects on the
Chilean real exchange rate.
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38Figure 4 shows that the domestic .interest  rate in  Chile became
less responsive to domestic credit expansion, while the effects of
foreign  interest  rates  at  the  end  of  the  sample  period  were
stronger than at the beginning, although the coefficient fluctuated
in value during the process of liberalization.
In Figure  5 we see that net exports became more responsive
(negatively)  to  financial  wealth  effects,  and  more  positively
responsive  to real  interest rate  effects.  The  behavior of  net
exports thus became more  closely linked to factors in financial
markets during the period of liberalization.
In Figure 6, reserves were less responsive, negatively,  at
the end of the period to foreign assets  (or the foreign debt) and
to foreign interest rates, although the response pattern to foreign
interest rates showed strong fluctuations, indicating some periods
of highly responsive capital movements  and reserve  losses due to
foreign interest rate movements.
The results for New Zealand appear in Figures 7 through 10.
For the response pattern of the real exchange rate, we see that it
became  progressively  more  dependent  (negatively),  on  financial
wealth  and more  dependent  (negatively) on  government  spending.
Thus domestic monetary and fiscal factors became more significant
determinants of the real exchange rate as the economy became more
financially open.
Figure 8 pictures the effects of the lagged foreign interest
levels  and  the  lagged  foreign asset  and  reserve  stocks  on the
change in domestic interest rates.  The upper graph shows that the
two lagged level effects diminish in absolute value terms in their
39effects  on  the  change  in  domestic  interest  rates,  indicating
greater  convergence  at the end of the period.  The  lower  graph
shows  sign-switching:  at the  end  of  the  period  foreign  asset
effects,  indicated  by  the  solid  curve,  became  negative,  while
reserve  accumulation  effects,  represented  by  the  broken  curve,
became positive.
Figure  9 pictures  the movement  of  coefficients  in the  net
export equation.  While the effects of real exchange rate changes
had slightly lower positive effects on the net export balance at
the end of the period, net export became negatively more responsive
to real interest rate changes, by a factor of six.  Thus, as the
economy became more open financially, interest rates had stronger
(negative)  effects  on  the  current  account  through  the  capital
inflow  effect,  which  dominated  the  positive  effects  through
aggregate consumption and investment.  Financial and capital market
effects  became  more  important  for  the  current  account  as
liberalization progressed.
Finally,  Figure  10  pictures  the  response  of  reserves  to
foreign assets  and to foreign  interest rates.  The  results  are
difterent from the Chilean response pattern.  We see that reserves
became  less  responsive  to  foreign assets  in New  Zealand, while
foreign interest rates Lad  progressively stronger negative effects.
Foreign interest rates became more important, rather than less, as
determinants  of  reserves,  as  private  asset  holders  responded
progressively  more to foreign interest rates.  Foreign assets  or
debts, mostly private, had  less influence on reserves as foreign
interest rates became more important.
40IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Tests show that financial liberalization experiences have both
important similarities and differences.  Financial liberalization
can  have  very  different  effects,  depending  on  the  way  it  is
implemented, on the array of transactions  costs on domestic  and
international assets, and on the public or private status of its
existing  international debts.  While  Chile  and New  Zealand  are
clear  cases  of  rapid  liberalization,  the  way  macroeconomic
variables evolved in their responses to domestic and international
variables show a very different adjustment, reflecting differences
in the deep  "transactions costs" parameters as well as different
risk factors associated with its external debts.
Despite  the  differences,  our  results  show  that  domestic
interest rates  became  less volatile when the capital account  is
opened, while the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to changes
in fundamentals  increases with  financial openness.  The results
also suggest that financial market factors as  well as fiscal policy
become more  important determinants of the real exchange rate and
net exports as financial liberalization progresses.  Since both of
these  variables  have  important effects on employment  and growth
during  the  adjustment  process,  our  analysis  of  Chile  and  New
Zealand shows that misguided fiscal or financial policy can exact
high costs when an economy becomes more financially open.
41AP_tNDIX  .
To obtain  the  slopes  of the  non-traded  market  equilibrium
condition and of the steady-state equilibrium condition implying a
stationary level of foreign assets, as represented by schedules NN
and (f=o) in figure 1, differentiate equations  (9) and (11).  The
corresponding slopes are given in equations (Al) and (A2),  where d
denotes  total  differentials  and  8  partial  derivatives,  and  the
signs in brackets are those of the partial derivatives:
(Al) dp/df =  (0cN/Ow)/[8yY/8p-8cC/Np-8cC/8w  aw/P 8 ajN1 8P]  < O
t+]  t-]  t+]  t+J  (+J  [+t
(A2) dp/df =  tpa  aCT/aW_(i+EO-7re)]/C((P-1  NX)+pa ayT/ap-acT/8p
(+J  (+]  (-I
=  CT/OW  aw/8p  -aJT/aP)  ]  >  0
t  I-]  t+J]  E-
While  equation  (Al) has  an unambiguous  negative  sign,  both the
numerator  and  the denominator  of equation  (A2) can have  either
sign.  However  in footnote 4 we assume  that  net exports depend
unambiguously and positively on the real exchange rate p, implying
a positive denominator of (A2).
In the absence of additional information on parameter values
one could expect that the magnitude of the slopes  of the excess
demand curves for traded and non-traded goods with respect to p are
similar, so that the magnitude of the denominator of (Al)  is higher
than that of  (A2).
The sign of the numerator of (A2) depends on the magnitude of
the wealth  effect on consumption relative to the interest effect
42stemming from higher foreign assets.-  In Figure  1 we assume that
the wealth effect dominates, so that the numerator is positive.
APPENDIX 2
I.  sign-dependencies in Equation (23)
We might expect a dominance of the positive effects of i  + k?,
LR, and f on domestic intez- t r-^-.e  i for the following reasons.
The ambiguous effect  of i  + k  stems from the  fact that an
increase  in the  arbitrage  interest  level  reduces  desired  (i.e.
long-run) money demand LD, therefore increasing i,,  but at the same
time  it reduces  (shifts) the short-run or current money demand,
reducing it. The higher g  is, and the lower the magnitude  of the
cross derivative of the money demand ( L/a(i  + £)],  the higher is
the probability that the first effect dominates,  as we assume is
the case.
The ambiguity  of the  effect of f on i also  stems  from two
channels.  Assuming again the dominance of  3 on aL/a(i  +  kg),  an
increase in f reduces  i.  But on the other hand there  is also a
wealth effect of f via higher financial wealth, which increases i.
Under dominance of the second channel, the net effect of f on i is
positive.
43FOOTNOTES
1.  Dornbusch (1985)  analyzes overborrowing in  Latin America which
led to the 1982 debt crisis.  He emphasized the role of domestic
policies.  Calvo  et  at.  (1992) study  the  recent  resumption  of
capital flows to Latin America, emphasizing the role of external
factors.  For a detailed analysis of Chile's 1975-83 bust-boom-bust
cycle,  see Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1988).  See Dornbusch and
Reynoso  (1989)  for  a  more  general  survey  of  financial  issues,
including  the  role  of  inflationary finance,  in the  development
process.
2.  See Spencer and Carey  (1988)  and Hunn, Mayes,  and Williams
(1989)  for details on the financial policy reforms put in place in
New Zealand in 1985.
3.  In our analysis, we compare dynamic adjustment of the nominal
interest rate with the real exchange rate, rather  than the real
interest rate with the real exchange rate.  We do so because the
nominal  interest  rate  is  the  variable  which  clears  the  money
market,  and  the  real  exchange rate  clears  the  non-traded  goods
market.  Their  dynamic  behavior  reflects  the  underlying
disequilibria in these two markets.  The nominal interest rate is
consistent  with  the  real  interest  rate  driving  intertemporal
consumption and investment decisions.
444.  A major  limitation of this paper  is that we do not cover the
issue of sequencing of capital and current-account liberalization.
For a recent survey, see Hanson  (1992).
5.  Niehans  (1991,  1992)  recently  analyzed  the  effects  of
financial liberalization under a wider-array of transactions costs
parameters.  He found that the effects of financial liberalization
in a variety of cases depends more on the relationships  between
individual transactions costs than on their general level.
6.  Q is replaced by a function depending negatively on the real
exchange rate. The positive influence of p on w stems from the fact
that  an  increase  in p  reduces  the  general  price  deflator  and
therefore  increases  the  value  of  real  money  and  domestic  bond
holdings for given M and B.
7.  We cite the recent work by Butlin  (1985), Brock  (1985) and
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1987),  among others, which extend previous work on
intertemporal optimization, and derive behavioral functions in the
context of a dependent or small open economy.
8.  Consumption  demands  in  equations  (9)  and  (10)  depend
ambiguously on own real interest rates because of the well-known
opposite signs of the substitu%ion and wealth effects. Investment
demands depend unambiguously and negatively on their own real rates
of interest in each sector.  We simplify our dynamic analysis by
dropping the effect "f interest rates on consumption.
459.  In addition to the variables we include in (9),  factor prices
could  determine  output  supplies  while  investment  could  depend
either  on  factor  prices  or  output  levels.  This  opens  the
possibility  of  explicitly  introducing unemployment  and  business
cycles, through exogenous or sluggish factor prices and accelerator
mechanisms.
10.  We  postulate  that  net  exports  depend  unambiguously  and
positively  on  the  real  exchange  rate.  This  assumes  very
realistically  that  the  indirect  price  effect  of  a  higher  real
exchange  rate  on  consumption  via  a  wealth  rise  is  more  than
compensated by the sum of the direct effects of higher p on traded
goods production, consumption and investment.
11.  When the debt-servicing effect of a rise in f dominates the
wealth  effect,  i.e. when  the  (f-O) curve  is negatively  sloped,
there is an unambiguous rise in the stationary values of both the
foreign debt and the real exchange rate.
12.  This dominance depends on value of the speed of adjustment  3,
and  thus  on  the  intensity  of  legal  restrictions,  as  shown  in
equation  (18).
13.  Expected  inflation v1t  (the expectation of inflation between
periods t and t+1, as of  period t) and expected nominal devaluation
(defined similarly) are obtained from autoregressive  time-series
46specifications for  actual  ratea 4of  inflation  and  nominal
devaluation.
14.  The  results  of  the  Phillips-Perron  tests  appearing  in  Table 1
are for lag  truncations  at zero.  The same  results  held up at lag
truncations  1  through  4. A copy  of  a Matlab  (1990)  program  for  the
Phillips  - Perron  tests  is available  from  the first  author.
15.  Unfortunately,  the length  of observations  made  it impossible
to test  for  cointegration  among  the  variables,  using  the  Johansen  -
Juselius  (1991)  test.  Thus, we  could not  specify an  error-
correction  mechanism  in our dynamic  analysis.
16.  These  tests  are  a part  of the  Micro  TSP Version  7.1  program,
and are  discussed  in Hall,  Johnston,  and  Lilien (1990).
17.  A copy of a Matlab program for Kalman filtering, using the
program  provided  with  Hansen-Sargent  (1991),  is  available  from  the
first  author  upon  request.
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